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Article 9

WHAT'S RACE GOT TO DO WITH IT?
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE LATINO
ELECTORATE IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARY SEASON
LAURA E. GOMEZ, J.D., PH.D.*
INTRODUCTION

The 2008 presidential election was perhaps the most significant in U.S.
history for Latinos,1 who have surpassed African Americans as the nation's
largest minority group. By 2050, when non-Latino whites in the U.S. will
be less than fifty percent of the nation's population, Latinos are projected to
2
be thirty percent, double the estimated percentage of African Americans.
The election was history-making for Latinos for at least three reasons.
This was the first presidential election in which a Latino candidate sought
the nomination of a major party. New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson
was a viable candidate and competed in several Democratic caucuses and
primaries before withdrawing from the presidential race. 3 As several
* A.B., Harvard College; M.A., Ph.D., Sociology, Stanford University; J.D., Stanford. I am grateful
to Esperanza Lujan and Kelly E. Sloane for research assistance with this article, as well as to the staff of
the University of New Mexico School of Law Library. I acknowledge valuable feedback I received
from presentations to St. John's Law School Symposium on the 2008 presidential election, the UNM
School of Law Faculty Colloquium, the American Studies Association annual meeting, the Center for
the Study of Race, Ethnicity and Politics at UCLA, and the UNM Department of American Studies
Brown-Bag Speakers Series. I am grateful for editorial feedback on this article, as well as for my lifelong interest in politics, to my father, Antonio J. G6mez.
I I use the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably to refer collectively to persons in the
U.S. who trace their origins to Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba or other Spanish-speaking countries.
2 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by MidCentury (Aug. 14,
2008), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/
012496.html (projecting that the Hispanic population will triple from now until 2050, from 46.7 million
to 132.8 million, while the black population will only increase from 41.1 million to 65.7 million).
3 See generally BILL RICHARDSON, BETWEEN WORLDS: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LIFE
(2005). Richardson's biography describes growing up bi-racial - the son of a white, American father
and a Mexican mother who remained in Mexico City after his parents divorced. Id.
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political scientists have noted, Richardson's candidacy focused early
interest on the presidential election among Latino voters and signaled other
candidates to step up their wooing of the Latino electorate early in the
primary season. 4
Richardson was the first presidential candidate to present a specific
marketing plan to target Latino voters, invoking Spanish in naming the
strategy "Mi Familia con Richardson" ("My Family is with Richardson"). 5
Richardson's effort to appeal to Latino voters was eventually more than
matched by Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, when they
became the leading contenders for the Democratic nomination. Clinton
was widely seen as running the most vigorous Latino outreach campaign in
presidential election history, which may have directly led to her carrying
the Latino vote in most of the Democratic primaries. 6 While Democratic
presidential candidates had actively courted the Mexican American vote
since at least John F. Kennedy's 1960 campaign for president (with his
"Viva Kennedy" clubs), it has only been since 2000 that presidential
candidates have engaged in substantial advertising via the Spanishlanguage media. 7 The amount of Spanish-language advertising employed
by candidates increased massively between 2004 and 2008.8
Finally, the Latino electorate played a decisive role in the election of
Obama as the 44th President of the United States. There were a record
number of Latino voters, estimated to have been between 9.6 and 11
million, or at least two million more than voted in the 2004 presidential

4 Matt A. Barreto et. al., "Should They Dance with the One Who Brung 'Em?" Latinos and the
2008 Presidential Election, PS: POL. SC1. & POL. 753, 754 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/PSOct08BarretoFraga~etal.pdf
Richardson initially criticized other
Democratic leaders for their traditional ways of attracting Latino voters, emphasizing that Democrats
needed to appeal to Latinos as "mainstream Americans, and also as bilingual and bicultural
Americans." Id.
5 Id. (noting that Richardson was the only presidential candidate who had a fully parallel Spanishlanguage website).
6 Id. at 755 (positing that Clinton carried the Latino vote due to name recognition and support for
her husband, endorsements from prominent Latino officials, as well as vigorous outreach to the Latino
community).
7 Matt A. Barreto, iSi Se Puede! Latino Candidatesand the Mobilization ofLatino Voters, 101 AM.
POL. Sa. REV. 425, 427 (2007), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/APSRAug07Barreto.pdf
(observing that modem campaigns rely on Spanish-language targeted advertising to emphasize a
particular candidate's connection to the Latino community).
8 FEDERICO A. SUBVERI-VILEZ, THE MASS MEDIA AND LATINO POLITICS: STUDIES OF U.S.

MEDIA CONTENT, CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES AND SURVEY RESEARCH: 1984-2004 2 (Federico A.
Subveri-V&1ez, ed., 2008) [hereinafter THE MASS MEDIA]. In addition to the sheer demographic growth
of the Latino electorate, the Spanish-language media has mushroomed and Latinos have been
increasingly recognized as having substantial spending power. Id. In 2007, Latinos nation-wide spent
more than $960 billion, and advertisers have increasingly focused on them. Id.
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election. 9 Over the course of the last three presidential elections, the
number of Latino voters has more than doubled. 10 Latinos played a key role
in flipping four key states from red in 2004 to blue in 2008: Colorado,

Florida, Nevada and New Mexico. 11 The Republican Party had hoped a
sufficient number of Latinos would remain in their column, since President
George W. Bush had been re-elected in 2004 with the support of forty
percent of Latinos.12 But in 2008, two-thirds of Latinos backed Obama.13

Among first-time Latino voters and Latinos under age thirty, Obama
14
captured seventy-six percent of the vote.
This article looks back to a time period when it was far from clear
whether President Obama would win the Latino vote and when many
pundits predicted that anti-black racism would prevent Latinos from
supporting an African-American presidential candidate.
This article

presents a critical analysis of press coverage of Latinos and the presidential
election during the Democratic Primary, from January through June 2008.15
The foundation of this article is a content analysis of 408 articles published
in four newspapers about Latinos and the presidential election during the
primary season. The four newspapers - The Los Angeles Times, The New
York Times, The Chicago Tribune and The Dallas Morning News - were
selected because they are well respected as newspapers of record and
because they represent diverse regions of the country (two from the

northeast, two from the southwest). Each is a daily newspaper in a
metropolitan area with a population ranging from twenty to forty-five
percent Latino.16
9 Ivan Moreno, In Key States, Latino Vote Fueled Obama's Victory, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-11-10-605364295_x.htm. This estimate was made one
week after the election by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO). Id.
10 See THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that in 1996, five million Latinos voted).
I1 Moreno, supra note 9 (quoting Denver's first Hispanic mayor and national co-chairman of the
Obama campaign, Federico Pefia as saying, "[w]ithout the Latino vote, we would not have won those
states").
12 Id. (illustrating the power of the Latino vote).
13 Id. (demonstrating the swing nature of the Latino demographic).
14 Id. See Barreto, supra note 4, at 755 (noting that President Bill Clinton won seventy-five percent
of all Latinos in his 1992 re-election bid).
15 See THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 8, at 3, 195. This article contributes to scholarly research on
Latino voters and the media, which is sorely lacking, as is analysis of media coverage of Latinos during
presidential elections. Id.
16 AUDIT BUREAU OF CIRCULATIONS, Sept. 30, 2008. 1 do not argue that these four newspapers are
in any sense representative of all newspapers, but selecting these four papers from diverse regions made
for a feasible content analysis of press coverage. It is fair to ask whether including one or more Spanishlanguage newspapers would have yielded a different analysis. Compared to English-language dailies,
Spanish-language newspapers reach a relatively small audience; compare Los Angeles's La Opinion
with a 53,000 circulation to The Los Angeles Times with a circulation of one million. Id. See THE MASS
MEDIA, supra note 8, at 56. At the same time, large segments of the Latino population are fully
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The first section provides background and initial assumptions about a
number of topics, including the diversity of the Latino population, the
complexity of Latino racial identity and the media's role in the
reproduction of racial ideology. The second section of the article describes
the methodology and data in more detail and also presents an overview of
the major findings. The third section delves deeply into the prevalence in
the press of the black-brown divide as a major theme in coverage of the
Latino electorate and the 2008 presidential election. I describe its origins
early in the primary season, debunk it based on contemporary and historical
evidence and analyze why the media was drawn to it as racial common
sense. In the conclusion, I offer some speculations about the future role of
Latinos in American politics and changing racial dynamics in the United
States.
I. RACIAL COMMON SENSE AND OTHER GUIDING PREMISES
A. How Ideas About Race Come to be Common Sense
Legal scholar Ian Haney L6pez has written about how racial ideas were
taken for granted in the context of Mexican Americans within California's
criminal justice system in the 1970s. 17 His idea of racial common sense,
however, applies more broadly across time, space and various racial
contexts. Racial common sense refers to the fact that "ideas regarding
racial characteristics, categories, and properties usually remain in the
background, a body of knowledge so widely shared and so frequently
depended upon that most people treat racial beliefs as timeless truths."18
Racial common sense is an important foundational assumption in this
bilingual or speak only English, Id. For example, fifty-five percent of Latinos in New York, thirty-four
percent of Latinos in Chicago, and twenty-five percent of Latinos in Los Angeles are bilingual or speak
only English, suggesting that they prefer English-language media. Id. at 196. A leading scholar of
Latinos and the media also makes this point:
[Mainstream, English-language daily newspapers] are important for the political socialization of
the population at large. This includes Latinos, especially those who speak (or read) only English or
are bilingual and interested in a fuller spectrum of the political happenings in their respective
communities. What and how they cover pertaining to the political life of this component of the
population may potentially affect Latinos' knowledge about, involvement in and mobilization
during elections and other civic matters.
Id.
17 See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 3 (2008). See
also MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960s

TO THE 1990s 3 (2d ed. 1994). Similarly, sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant invoked racial
common sense in their landmark book, stating "[e]veryone 'knows' what race is, though everyone has a
different opinion as to how many racial groups there are, what they are called, and who belongs in what
specific racial categories." Id.
18 LOPEZ, supra note 17, at 119.
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article, in that it allows us to conceptualize the fact that both producers of
the news about the Latino electorate (that is, reporters and editors) and the
consumers of such news (readers with a variety of racial positions), operate
within a realm where racial meanings are ubiquitous though largely
unstated.
The notion of racial common sense takes on greater importance in the
present moment because color-blind racism is the dominant racial ideology
in the United States. Color-blind racism asserts that racial inequality
persists because of decidedly non-racial dynamics, such as market forces,
cultural values and individual choices.1 9 Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
argues that color-blind racism arose in the late 1960s (though it became
entrenched later than that) as a way to explain ongoing racial inequality
even in the face of the demise of formal racism, as evidenced by legal
landmarks such as the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the enactment of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts in
1964 and 1965, and the implementation of federal affirmative action and
set-aside programs in the 1970s. 20 Color-blind racism should thus be
understood as a central feature of racial common sense as we collectively
know it today.
The concepts of race, racial difference and racial categories are socially
constructed. Rather than having any inherent, fixed significance, race is
historically contingent and given meaning in a given social context, via the
interactions among persons, institutions, and social processes. 2 1 Indeed, the
idea that race is rooted in social meanings and interaction (that is, that race

19 EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 2006). Bonilla-Silva provides
the example of residential segregation to illustrate color-blind racism:
[Riesidential segregation, which is almost as high today as it was in the past, is no longer
accomplished through overtly discriminatory practices. Instead, covert behaviors such as not
showing all the available units, steering minorities and whites into certain neighborhoods,
quoting higher rents or prices to minority applicants, or not advertising units at all are the
weapons of choice to maintain [racially] separate communities.
Id. In addition to the covert practices Bonilla-Silva identifies the continuing effects of historical
practices, which are both overt and covert as well as private and government-sponsored, as an essential
foundation for the continued success of maintaining the racial segregation of neighborhoods. Id.
20 Id. at 3 (arguing that whites explain continuing inequality as a product of market forces).
21 LAURA E. GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 3
(2007). See OMI & WINANT, supra note 17, at vii. "[T]he enduring role race plays in the social
structure-in organizing social inequalities of various sorts, in shaping the very geography of American
life, in framing political initiatives and state action." Id. See also Laura E. G6mez, A Tale of Two
Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 458 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2004). The notion that race is
socially constructed initially developed in the sociological literature, but today it has been embraced
well beyond that discipline (and even the social sciences), including in much legal scholarship (such as
critical race theory). Id.
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is socially constructed), rather than being a fixed biological or physical
characteristic has buttressed the ideology of color-blind racism. For
example, someone who subscribes to the color-blind approach could reason
in the following way: If race is what we make of it, then we can choose to
ignore race and then racial differences will disappear. 22 Yet the idea that
race is not "real" (and thus not a deserving basis for government policy)
does not follow implicitly from the claim that race is socially constructed.
Race as a feature of social reality governs our interactions at the micro
level (face-to-face interactions among individuals), as well as at the macro
level in the ways that social institutions and organizations are structured. It
is in these ways that racial differences and racial categories remain
meaningful in American society. Thus, race persists, both in terms of its
historical legacy and its power in shaping reality today, as "the most
powerful and persistent group boundary in American history,
distinguishing, to varying degrees, the experiences of those classified as
non-White from those classified as White, with often devastating
consequences."

23

A comment about the connections between the concepts of "race" and
"ethnicity" is in order. The concept of "ethnicity" arose in the 1920s and
1930s as an alternative to an idea of race rooted in eugenics; where race
was tied to biology (nature), ethnicity was viewed as rooted in culture
(nurture). 24 This distinction, which persisted as ethnicity rose to become
the dominant explanatory framework in sociology in the 1940s and 1950s,
fueled the conception of ethnicity as a group identity that could be chosen
by group members, as opposed to race as a group identity that was imposed
on people by the dominant society. 25 Under the ethnicity paradigm, non-

22 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007). Chief
Justice John Roberts made this type of argument in the Supreme Court's majority opinion in the 2007
case involving the use of students' race as one factor in school assignment. He said in the penultimate
sentence of the majority opinion, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." Id. The idea that race is irrelevant to any meaningful differences
among people, that race is socially constructed, is implicit in Chief Justice Roberts' characterization, as
it is in much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on race in the post-Civil Rights Movement era.
23 STEPHEN CORNELL & DOUGLAS HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE: MAKING IDENTITIES IN A
CHANGING WORLD 25 (1998).
24 OMI & WINANT, supra note 17, at 14-15 (revealing that the ethnicity paradigm that arose in the
1920s and 1940s was "an explicit challenge" to the prevailing racial views of the period).
25 These ideas are described as assertion versus assignment in the sociological literature. See
CORNELL & HARTMANN, supra note 23, at 25. Today many scholars view both race and ethnicity as
having elements of assertion and assignment, even as they acknowledge that not all groups or all
members of a group have the same ability to exercise choice. Id. For a study of Mexican Americans
arguing that dynamics of assignment and assertion interacted to produce a racial group, see generally,
GOMEZ, supra note 21.
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white groups such as African Americans, Puerto Ricans and Mexican
Americans have been compared to European immigrant groups (so-called
white ethnics). This assimilation model predicted that these groups either
would eventually assimilate culturally and economically; or if they did not
do so, argued that this result was due to non-racial reasons, such as market
forces, cultural values and the like. 26 At times then, reliance on an ethnic
framework has functioned to obscure the dynamics of systematic racial
oppression in the United States, as well as the particular ways in which
racial ideology plays a role in reproducing racial inequality. 2 7 As a result,
in this article, I use the concept of race, rather than ethnicity, to refer to
Latinos generally and to Latino sub-groups, such as Mexican Americans,
2
specifically. 8
B. Latinos and the Census
An important factor in the formation of racial common sense in this
nation is the census, as well as other government-sponsored data collection
on race. The variation in how the census has defined and counted racial
categories from decade to decade "both reflects and in turn shapes racial
understanding and dynamics. It establishes often contradictory parameters
of racial identity into which both individuals and groups must fit."29 This
has been particularly true for Latinos, who, in the official census, are
conceived of as an ethnic, rather than a racial, group. Historically, neither
Latinos in general nor Mexican Americans specifically were separately
counted in the census. 30

26

KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN

AMERICA 144 (1998). Anthropologist Karen Brodkin goes further in asserting that theories of ethnicity
were invented in order to justify relative failures of blacks and other racial minorities to assimilate as
their fault (rather than as due to structural and institutional dynamics). Id.
27 For a recent longitudinal, quantitative analysis testing whether the ethnic or racial models most
accurately describes the experiences of Mexican Americans (and concluding that the racial model wins
out) see generally, EDWARD TELLES & VILMA ORTIz, GENERATIONS OF EXCLUSION: MEXICAN
AMERICANS, ASSIMILATION, AND RACE (2008).

28 Omi and Winant similarly conclude that race trumps ethnicity in many contexts in terms of its
explanatory power. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 17, at 20-23. For a provocative analysis of where
U.S. race relations are headed in the 21st century and how some Latinos may become "honorary
whites," while others will move into the "collective black" category, see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva &
Karen S. Glover, "We are all Americans ": The Latin Americanization of Race Relations in the United
States, in THE CHANGING TERRAIN OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 150 (Maria Krysan & Amanda E. Lewis

eds., 2006).
29 OMI AND WINANT, supra note 17, at 3.

30 An exception was the 1930 census. For a more extensive discussion, see GOMEZ, supra note 21,
at 150-60.
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This changed in 1980, when the U.S. Census Bureau made a decision to
treat Latinos as a specific ethnic group, but not as a racial group. 3 1 In the
past three decadal censuses, U.S. residents have been asked to identify
themselves as members of a racial group and, in a separate question, as
Hispanic or non-Hispanic. The race question asks, "What is this person's
race?" and directs the person to mark one or more of several options,
including white, black, American Indian, one of several Asian American
categories, or "some other race." The Hispanic ethnicity question asks, "Is
this person Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?" and provides choices including
"no," "Mexican American," "Puerto Rican," "Cuban," and "other
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino."
As of 2007, fifteen percent of the U.S.
population is Latino, and sixty-five percent of Latinos are Mexican
Americans, dwarfing by far any other Latino sub-group.32 The next largest
sub-group is Puerto Ricans at nine percent (including only mainland Puerto
Ricans); six percent of Latinos trace their origins to the various Central
American countries; and around three percent each are Cuban or
Dominican. 33
One factor motivating the Census Bureau's decision to treat Latinos as
an ethnic rather than as a racial group was the fact that Latinos can be of
any race. For example, Cuban Americans variously identify as white or
black; Mexican Americans variously identify as indigenous (American
Indian under the census formulation) or white, and so on. In part, this is
the result of the historical racial mixture that occurred with the Spanish
colonization of the Americas in the 15th through the 19th centuries. For
example in 1650, Mexico's population contained equal numbers of
Spaniards and Africans (as both were identified by record-keeping
officials, not according to self-identification), but ten times as many
Indians and Spanish-Indian mestizos than either Spaniards or Africans. 34
Unlike the United States and many other European colonies, the Spanish
did not legally ban sexual and marital unions across these racial groups
(although they discouraged them and encouraged unions that would
"whiten" the population at various times), and the population of Mexico
rapidly became racially mixed, though predominantly indigenous. In fact,
31 On the role of Mexican American and other Latino civil rights organizations and activists in this
outcome, see id.
32

U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU,

HISPANIC

AMERICANS

BY THE NUMBERS

(2007), available at

http://www.infoplease.com/spot/hhmcensusl .html (demonstrating the varying population differences in
Hispanic sub-groups in the U.S. for 2007).
33 See id. (giving statistics on Hispanic Americans and Hispanic sub-groups).
34 GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 51 (explaining that racial mixture present in Mexico in 1646
eventually resulted in an inevitable mestizo population).
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one of the main tenets of the anti-Mexican racism, which fueled the U.S.
war with Mexico in 1846 and was pervasively addressed in Congress and
the press, was the "mongrelization" of Mexicans and their resulting racial
inferiority. 35
Moreover, Latin American societies did not embrace the hypo-descent
rule of black ancestry that has governed racial categorization in the U.S.
since the early 20th century. 36 Over time and with increasing levels of
racial mixing in the population, Mexico's black population has become
almost invisible largely because of anti-black racism. Although similar
levels of mixing occurred in other Spanish colonies, the base populations
with which they began varied. For example, in Puerto Rico, Cuba and the
Dominican Republic, the indigenous populations were largely decimated,
leading to the importation of massive numbers of African slaves and the
later mixing between Spaniards and Africans. 37 Large numbers of U.S.
residents who trace their ancestry to these countries may be identified by
others as black, but the census results show that they do not self-identify as
black in large proportions. In 2000, eleven percent of Dominicans
identified themselves as black, seven percent of Puerto Ricans did so, and
four percent of Cubans did S0.38
Yet Latinos' racial identity is by no means only driven by white
supremacy; if it were, we would expect virtually all Latinos to claim
"white" racial status in the census. In fact, almost half of them refuse to
identify themselves as white, black, Asian or Native American; instead,
they select "some other race" on the census race question. This is
particularly striking because only one percent of non-Latinos chose "some
other race" (in other words, ninety-nine percent of non-Latinos select one
of the listed options for race). 39 More importantly, there are tremendous
35 Id. at 18-19 (discussing the role of racism in the U.S. declaration of war against Mexico).
36 Id. at 144 (explaining that in the 1920s and 1930s, the hypo-descent rule became the American
rule for defining black status). See VIRGINIA DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 8 (2d prtg. 1997) (stating that the explanation for ethnic
boundaries is a combination of individual self-interest and manipulation of cultural attributes for
personal ends); see also JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN THE
UNITED STATES 134-36 (La. State Univ. Press 1994) (1980) (discussing a genesis of a new people with
a new culture beginning in slavery that bore a fusion of Africa, Europe, and the New World).
37 For a discussion of how this played out in the Dominican Republic, see generally GINETTA E.B.
CANDELARIO, BLACK BEHIND THE EARS: DOMINICAN RACIAL IDENTITY FROM MUSEUMS TO BEAUTY
SHOPS 2 (2007).
38 See GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 156 (stating the numbers of national-origin subgroups which
identity as black); see also Bonilla-Silva supra note 19, at 187 (presenting a table on a 2000 study of
Racial Self-Classification by Selected Latin American Origin Latino Ethnic Groups); see generally
CANDELARIO, supra note 37, at 2 (illustrating the complexities of Dominican racial identity in the U.S.).
39 See GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 153, 156 (noting variation among Latino subgroups).
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differences among Latino sub-groups in how often they select "white"
versus "some other race." 40 For example in 2000, eighty-eight percent of
Cuban Americans selected "white" and only eight percent selected "some
other race." 4 1 But Mexican Americans were almost equally split between
those who selected "white" and those who selected "some other race" (fifty
and forty-seven percent, respectively). 42 Among Mexican Americans, the
proportion that has rejected white racial identification has increased over
the last three decades, 4 3 and young people and immigrants are more likely
to select "some other race." 44 Among Puerto Ricans, fifty-two percent
select white, seven percent select black, and thirty-nine percent select
"some other race" (again, excluding Puerto Ricans on the island).4 5 Fiftynine percent of Dominicans select "some other race," while twenty-eight
percent say they are white, and eleven percent say they are black. 46 Thus,
among the four Latino sub-groups, the percentage rejecting a white, black
or Indian identity ranges from a low of seven percent (Cubans) to a high of
fifty-nine percent (Dominicans). 47
The Census Bureau's official policy is simply to fold those selecting
"some other race" into the white category (hence the need for the "nonHispanic white" nomenclature), but I submit that we should take Latinos'
racial self-identification seriously. Were we to do so, we might well
conclude that close to half of all Latinos see Latino/Hispanic as a racial
category that distinguishes Latinos from whites, African Americans, Asian
Americans and American Indians. Moreover, I do not necessarily assume
that Latinos who select "white" on the race question are "white-identified"
40 Id. at 156-57. The selection of "some other race" does not appear to be a function of racial
mixture or multi-racial self-identification among Latinos. For the first time, the 2000 census allowed
respondents to identify in multiple racial groups, yet only 2.4% of Americans did so (although data on
respondents' children suggests this proportion is likely to increase in the future). See Reynolds Farley,
Identifying with Multiple Races: A Social Movement That Succeeded But Failed, in THE CHANGING
TERRAIN OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 123-48 (Maria Krysan & Amanda E. Lewis eds., 2006).
41 GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 156-57.
42 Id.
43 GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 154 (stating data which indicates the proportion of Hispanics who
reject white racial identification is rising).
44 Id. at 154-55 (explaining possible explanations for why Hispanics divided their responses to the
race question between "white" and "some other race").
45 See id.; see generally Jorge Duany, Racializing Ethnicity in the Spanish-Speaking Caribbean, in
HOW THE UNITED STATES RACIALIZES LATINOS: WHITE HEGEMONY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Jose A.

Cobas, Jorge Duany & Joe R. Feagin eds., forthcoming 2009) (noting that Puerto Ricans living in
Puerto Rico self-identify as white at much higher rates, despite heavy African ancestry).
46 G6MEZ, supra note 21, at 157 (discussing the decisions by many Latinos to identify as
something other than white).
47 Id. at 156-57 (discussing which Hispanic subgroups are most likely and least likely to selfidentify as white).
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racially, as some scholars suggest. 4 8 Instead, I seek to interrogate the extent
to which selecting "white" over options including "some other race" and
"black," might say more about "white" as a default category, rather than an
affirmative racial identification. Considering that roughly half of all
Latinos are selecting the racial category "some other race," we can imagine
that many more would do so if "Latino/Hispanic" were listed separately as
an option on the race question. 49
C. UnderstandingDifferences Among Latinos

A comprehensive discussion of the tremendous differences among
Latinos is beyond the scope of this article, but I want to argue here that the
media, policymakers, scholars and the general public all need to be wary of
lumping together Latinos without sufficient attention to intra-Latino
differences. 50 The above discussion of racial identification via the census
provides some evidence of how important this is. Additionally, I suggest
that we look to the unique historical experiences of each Latino sub-group
as a corrective for the tendency to see all Latinos as an undifferentiated
monolith. Here I briefly compare the very different historical trajectories
of Cuban Americans and Mexican Americans as a way of illustrating the
imperative for sub-group specificity.
Cubans initially came to the U.S. as voluntary immigrants (some would
say as political refugees) fifty years ago. Most fled Cuba in the wake of the
1959 socialist revolution in "the silk stocking exodus," a term which
invokes the status of many Cuban immigrants to the U.S. as the most
affluent members of Cuban society at the time.5 1 Cubans benefited by
48 See Carleen Basler, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association, Crema
con Cafe: How Whiteness Affects Mexican American Identity (Oct. 16, 2008) (commenting on self
identification as to race questions in public surveys).
49 At least one study suggests that Latinos who selected "some other race" were more attached to
that choice than Latinos who selected "white," which further suggests that "white" may often be chosen
as a default category rather than a true expression of racial self-identification. See Sonya Tafoya,
SHADES OF BELONGING, 22, Pew Hispanic Center Report (Dec. 6, 2004), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=35.
50 Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva also has called for the breaking down of the Latino category
in order to clarify the differences among what he terms light-skinned and dark-skinned Latinos, arguing
that the former are part of an emerging middle racial category in the U.S. that he names "honorary
whites," while the latter will remain part of the broadening category at the bottom of the hierarchy that
he dubs "collective black." Bonilla-Silva & Glover, supra note 28, at 149-83. He places U.S. Latinos
who are Cuban, Argentine, Chilean, and Costa Rican in the honorary whites category, whereas Mexican
Americans and Puerto Ricans are placed in the category of collective black (although he does not
always appear to be consistent on this point; at times he refers to light-skinned individuals who could be
from any Latino sub-group and at other times referring to all Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans as
"dark-skinned."). Id. See also BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 19, at 177-205.
51 MARK Q. SAWYER, RACIAL POLITICS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA 155-57 (2006)
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entering American society in the midst of the civil rights era, when the
racial order was transitioning to formal equality, anti-discrimination laws
and affirmative action policies. Unlike Mexican immigrants, Cubans
benefited from a range of government assistance programs as refugees of a
country disfavored by the U.S. In 1960, the federal government established
the Cuban Refugee Program to help Cubans find jobs and housing, learn
English and adjust to their new society, whereas no such efforts were made
52
on behalf of Mexican immigrants (at that time or at any other time).
Today, U.S.-bom Cuban Americans have a higher median income than
non-Hispanic whites.5 3 Thus, when data on Cuban Americans is combined
with data on Mexican Americans and other Latinos, the overall Latino data
is substantially inflated; this is one reason we should sometimes speak of
the various Latino sub-groups specifically, rather than lumping them
together.
In contrast to Cubans, Mexican Americans initially became part of this
society involuntarily, not as immigrants, but as a nation conquered in war.
Mexican Americans sometimes say, "We didn't cross the border, the
border crossed us," as a shorthand reference to the fact that the first
Mexicans in the U.S. lived in the northern half of Mexico, which became
part of U.S. territory only 162 years ago. 54 Today 85 million Americans
live in this vast region, which extends from California to as far east as
Texas, and from the current U.S.-Mexico border to as far north as
Wyoming. 55 Elsewhere, I have described in detail the racial dimensions of
the process of colonization and incorporation of Mexican Americans into
the U.S. in the middle 19th century. 56 Here I want to briefly describe one
aspect of that unique history that may distinguish Mexican Americans from

(discussing how the first wave of Cuban immigrants were affluent and how later immigrants were given
financial assistance through the Cuban Refugee Program, which facilitated their assimilation to the
U.S.).
52 See CORNELL & HARTMANN, supra note 23, at 157-58 (noting that greater governmental
assistance was provided to Cuban emigrants than to Mexicans emigrants in the United States).
53

CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES - FACT SHEET 4, Pew Hispanic Center Report (Aug. 25, 2006),

available at http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetlD=23 (providing a statistical
analysis of Cubans in America, which included demographics, economic characteristics, and political
views).
54 GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 2.
55 Laura E. G6mez, Opposite One-Drop Rules: Mexican Americans, African Americans and the
Need to Re-Conceive Turn-of-the-20th-Century Race Relations, in HOW THE UNITED STATES
RACIALIZES LATINOS: WHITE HEGEMONY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Jose A. Cobas, Jorge Duany & Joe

R. Feagin, eds., forthcoming 2009) (discussing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Mexican
Cession of 1804).
56 See generally GOMEZ, supra note 21 (analyzing the U.S. colonization of Northern Mexico and
the racial status of Mexican Americans in the U.S.).
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other Latinos and that should be embraced as an important part of our
nation's racial history.
Mexican Americans were historically what I have called an "off-white"
group, simultaneously positioned as racially subordinated (socially nonwhite), while allowed certain legal rights sometimes limited to whites
(legally white, under limited circumstances). The earliest example of the
second phenomenon occurred in 1848 when 115,000 Mexicans living in the
vast region of northern Mexico became U.S. citizens overnight. Under the
peace treaty that ended the U.S.-Mexico War (1846-1848), these Mexican
citizens gained federal U.S. citizenship at a time when only white
immigrants could become naturalized U.S. citizens. In one of its first
major pieces of legislation, Congress in 1790 restricted the ability to
become a naturalized U.S. citizen to "free white persons." 57 The belief that
Mexicans were "but little removed above the Negro" was widespread
among both elite and average Americans at this time, yet Mexicans were
granted citizenship at a time when immigrants from Asia, Africa and many
other parts of the world could not, under any conditions, become citizens
because they were not "free white persons." 58 This illustrates the dynamic
of Mexican Americans' in-between status in the American racial hierarchy,
with whites above them and African Americans below them.
D. The Media's Role in Shaping Racial Common Sense
I began this section by describing how ideas about race take on the
character of "common sense" that most of us take for granted. An
important mechanism via which the racial common sense comes to exist or becomes conventional wisdom - is the mainstream news media,
including print journalism (newspapers, magazines), television journalism
and radio. The media exert a powerful pull over the construction of social
reality; in a sense, what we see and read becomes our social reality. The
media help make the world intelligible by simplifying social reality,
providing a kind of short-hand about extremely complex events and
dynamics that recur in the news. This is especially true when consumers of
media do not have direct contact with the subjects about whom they are
reading or watching in the media. Thus, for many Americans who still do

57 See IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 31(2006).

58 See GOMEz, supra note 21, at 59 (discussing the complexity of white Americans' attitudes
towards Mexicans and where Mexican Americans fit in the American racial hierarchy at the turn of the
20th century).
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not interact extensively with Latinos, what they read and see in the media is
the extent of their social vision of Latinos.
The media accomplishes this by playing an agenda-setting role, by
framing the way we think about aspects of our world (such as race), 59 and
by providing justifications for the current racial order. An old adage about
agenda-setting explains how it works: "the press 'may not be successful
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly
successful in telling its readers what to think about.' 60 In the context of
race, the media's agenda-setting function includes defining the parameters
of what counts as "race" (versus ethnic or class-based or other non-racial
conflict, for example).
Framing occurs when media producers decide whether a story is
newsworthy and decide how to present that story in a larger context. For
example, during the Democratic primary season, newspapers had to decide
whether the fact that Bill Richardson was Latino was newsworthy as the
central focus of an article. If they decided to run such a story, they had to
decide how to frame Richardson's Latino status, i.e., whether they would
use an ethnic or a racial frame. The mainstream news media remains
dominated by white reporters, editors and producers, with people of color
still largely in roles as tokens within large, complex media outlets; among
the four newspapers analyzed here, the smallest proportion of white
reporters and editors was seventy-seven percent, while the percentage of
minority reporters and editors ranged from fifteen percent at The Dallas
Morning News, to twenty-three percent at The Chicago Tribune.6 1
We know little about the processes by which mostly white journalists
(and editors) decide what is newsworthy about race-angle stories or about
the processes by which their own racial experiences affect how they write
about race. 62 But we can surmise that their own racial identity and
59 On the more narrow question of how the media frames race in elections involving non-white
candidates, see Stephen M. Caliendo & Charlton D. Mcllwain, Minority Candidates, Media Framing,
and Racial Cues in the 2004 Election, 11 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 45, 45-69 (2006).
60 Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36
PUB. OPINION Q. 176,176-87 (1972) (quoting Bernard C. Cohen) (emphasis in original).
61 See Minority Percentages at Participating Newspapers, http://www.imdiversity.com/Villages/
Careers/employmenttrends/asne-newsroomdiversity0407.asp
(last visited Sept. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Minority Percentages]. The four newspapers analyzed here reported in 2007 minority
journalists ranging from 15-23% of their staffs, meaning that 77-85% of their journalistic staffs are
white. Id. According to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, minority journalists were 23% at
the Chicago Tribune, 19% at the Los Angeles Times, 17% at the New York Times, and 15% at the
Dallas Morning News. Id. Minorities were defined as Asian Americans, Hispanics, blacks or Native
Americans.
62 See generally Meta G. Carstarphen, Uncovering Race in 2008: Media, Politics and the
Reporter's Eye, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 403 (2009) (interviewing 138 journalists about
what "said race" to them).
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experiences significantly influence their choices. We should therefore
presume that the media's coverage of race reflects dominant ideas about
race or how white elites in our society tend to view race. In this sense, the
media generally reinforces, helps to reproduce and justifies the existing
racial order. Given the pervasiveness of the color-blind racial ideology, the
media should be seen as generally reinforcing that ideology, in which it is
assumed that non-racial factors (market forces, cultural values, and so on)
are responsible for continuing high rates of racial inequality in American
society. The media also reinforces the dominant view of race in the U.S. as
white versus black Americans, rather than as a multi-racial notion of race,
although the latter is appearing with more frequency in the media. 63
II.

OVERVIEW OF DATA, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

This article is based on a content analysis of all articles dealing with
Latinos and the presidential election that appeared in the four targeted
newspapers during the Democratic primary season, January-June, 2008 - a
total of more than 400 articles. 64 This period included the first primary
event, the Iowa Caucus (Jan. 3) and the last Democratic primary contest,
Puerto Rico (June 1), shortly after which Senator Clinton suspended her
presidential campaign. Obama received the Democratic Party's nomination
for president on July 28, 2008. The newspapers studied were The New
York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune and The Dallas
Morning News, which have a combined daily circulation of 3.8 million. 65
63 Yet neither producers nor consumers of media are locked into dominant racial ideology
(producers, of course, do not only produce, but also consume media). Stuart Hall has theorized about
the relationship between how the media produces (or encodes, in his terminology) meaning and how the
audience consumes (or decodes) meaning. Journalists and other producers of media offer up a common
impression about the world in their work, and Hall has suggested that the audience responds in three
possible ways. Some viewers respond by reproducing the dominant (hegemonic) position, usually
presented in the mainstream media. Others respond by negotiating an intermediate position - they might
agree with some aspects of the message, but disagree with others. A third audience response is to reject
the dominant view (oppositional or counter-hegemonic). See generally Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding,
in MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES KEYWORKS 166-76 (Meenakshi Gigi Durham & Douglas M.
Kellner, eds. 2001).
64 A reasonable question is, why look at newspapers, when other media are more central in
American society today? First, newspapers of record remain extremely important as a source of media,
and this may be especially true for elites. A study of media coverage of elections showed that, between
1952 and 2000, 82% of Americans received their political news from television, while 69% received
their news from newspapers. See William L. Benoit and Glenn J. Hansen, The Changing Media
Environment of PresidentialCampaigns, Communication Research Reports, 21 COMM. RES. REP. 164,
164-73 (2004). While this study did not take into account the new internet-based media, we can expect
that newspapers are still an important source of news for many, if not most, Americans.
65 AUDIT BUREAU OF CIRCULATIONS, supra note 16 (illustrating that The New York Times Sunday
edition has a circulation of almost 1.5 million; the Los Angeles Times Sunday edition has a circulation
of almost 1 million; The Chicago Tribune Sunday edition has a circulation of almost 865,000; and the
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In addition to having solid journalistic reputations, these newspapers
were selected because they are published in metropolitan areas and states
with different types of Latino populations. For example, Chicago and New
York have diverse Latino populations composed of Puerto Ricans, Mexican
Americans and Latinos from many other sub-groups, while Dallas and Los
Angeles have Latino populations that are predominantly Mexican
American. While all four states have a large proportion of Latinos who are
immigrants, California and Texas also have many deeply-rooted Mexican
American families who can trace their family roots back many generations,
including back to the 19th century.
In selecting these newspapers I was also influenced by the proportion of
Latinos in the metropolitan areas where they were based, as well as the
relative proportion of Latinos and African Americans. Los Angeles County
has the largest Latino population of the four cities, at forty five percent, a
population fifty percent larger than the white population and more than four
times larger than the black population. 66 Dallas County has the second
largest Latino population, at thirty percent. The county is forty-four
percent white and twenty percent black, with its Latino population having
tripled between 1980 and 2000.67 New York City is eighteen percent
Latino, but the larger metropolitan area is twenty-seven percent Latino (and
probably a better match for the newspaper's home-base circulation).
Metropolitan New York has the same proportion of blacks as Latinos
(twenty-seven percent), and is forty-five percent white. 68 Cook County,
Illinois is fifty-six percent white, twenty-six percent black and twenty
69
percent Latino.
It is stunning to compare the racial make-up of the newspapers'
metropolitan areas with that of each newspaper's journalism staff. While
whites are thirty-one percent of the residents of Los Angeles County, they
are eighty-one percent of the reporters at the Los Angeles Times. Whites
are forty-four percent of the residents of Dallas County, but they are eightyfive percent of the reporters at the Dallas Morning News. They are fortyfive percent of the metro New York population, but eighty-three percent of
the reporters at the New York Times. Whites make-up fifty-six percent of

Dallas Morning News Sunday edition has a circulation of almost 484,000).
66 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2.
67 Id.
68 Id.

69 Id.
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Cook County and seventy-seven percent of the reporting staff at The
Chicago Tribune.70
The computerized search of these newspapers yielded a database of 408
articles about Latinos and the election during the primary as follows: 126 in
The New York Times, 115 in The Los Angeles Times, 85 in The Chicago
Tribune and 82 in The Dallas Morning News. Interestingly, the dispersal
of articles in these papers, with The Chicago Tribune and The Dallas
Morning News at the low end with just over 80 articles on this subject, and
with The New York Times (126) and The Los Angeles Times (115) at the
high end, is somewhat different from an earlier study. A 1988 study
reviewed headlines involving Latinos and politics in three of the same
newspapers (it included The San Antonio Express-News, but not The Dallas
Morning News). Researchers found that The Los Angeles Times ran almost
three times as many headlines featuring Latinos than The New York
Times.7 1 A decade later, this data may suggest that The New York Times has
ramped up its coverage of Latinos and politics and that The Los Angeles
Times no longer has the edge they might have taken for granted with a
large, long-present Latino population. One explanation for the relative
strength of The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times in their
coverage of Latinos during the primary season may be their relative wealth,
compared to The Chicago Tribune and The Dallas Morning News.
Circulation rates are a reasonable proxy for wealth, and the former two
newspapers may simply allocate greater resources to reporting on a wide
range of topics. 72
In general, the 408 articles were disappointing for their lack of context
and depth, revealed in their overly simplistic portrayals of Latino voters. 73
One hallmark of these newspapers' generally superficial reporting on
Latinos and the election was the tendency to treat the Latino electorate as
monolithic. Only a small proportion of the articles paid any attention to
substantial divisions among Latinos along the lines of national origin,
nativity, region, gender, education and social class, political ideology as
liberal or conservative, or religion. Age was the only factor differentiating
70 Minority Percentages, supra note 61 (noting the low numbers of minority participation on
newspaper staffs).
71 THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 8, at 198 (referencing several studies about newspapers with
Latino-related headlines).
72 See generally Shira Ovide, Tribune Co. Filesfor Chapter 11 Protection, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
2008, at BI. No effort was made to calculate the articles on Latinos and the presidential election as a
proportion of the newspaper's total output during this six-month period.
73 Such superficiality may well characterize the mainstream media's coverage of Latinos generally.
See THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 8, at 77 ("Latinos have more often than not been ignored or covered
in predominantly negative ways in general market media.").
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Latinos that garnered some attention (it was addressed in twenty of the 408
articles). Articles discussing the generation gap among Latinos - whether
they featured it or simply mentioned it - presented younger Latinos as
supporting Obama, and older ones as supporting Clinton. These articles
turned out to be correct, in that, just over two-thirds of all Latinos voted for
Obama in the general election, whereas three-fourths of Latinos under age
thirty did so. 74 If the press had been as attentive to other significant
divisions among Latinos, besides age, it would have much more accurately
predicted Obama's support among Latinos, rather than incorrectly
predicting Latinos would not support him. In other words, attention to the
diversity and complexity of the Latino electorate would have made for
better journalism by anyone's standards.
Three thematic areas dominated the press coverage of the Latino
electorate during the primary season. 75 Together, these three themes
account for nearly three-quarters of all press coverage on the Latino
electorate in these four newspapers. This suggests the extent to which
press coverage of Latino voters was largely unimaginative and
journalistically shallow.
The first theme was that Latino voters would support Hillary Clinton,
rather than Obama. Well over one-quarter of the articles addressed this
theme (148 articles), with this topic prominent in all four newspapers. This
theme was especially prominent in the Texas paper, where more than half
the articles on Latino voters concerned this topic (forty-four articles). It
was the subject of nearly one-third of the articles in the three other
newspapers (forty-seven articles in The New York Times, thirty-two articles
in The Los Angeles Times, and twenty-five articles in The Chicago
Tribune). The idea that Latinos would be squarely in Clinton's camp
reflected polling data at the time, but the extent of the press coverage of
this fact as a proportion of its coverage of the Latino electorate suggests the
press may have played a large role in perpetuating an overly-simplistic
view of Latinos as loyal to the Clinton-brand, rather than as up-for-grabs
like other Democratic voters. To some extent, this notion fed into a
broader stereotype of Latino voters as driven by emotion (loyalty to the
Clintons), rather than interests, as is presumed for other voters.
The second theme was somewhat of a contrast to the first theme, but in
other senses complementary to it. These articles explored how both
74 Moreno, supra note 9 (concluding that younger Latino voters helped to fuel Obama's victory).
75 I categorized the 408 articles according to their primary theme, with notes made about secondary
issues or themes they addressed. The numbers reported here in terms of themes relate only to the
primary themes explored in the 408 articles.
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Clinton and Obama were heavily vying for the Latino vote. This included
articles that discussed how the leading candidates were seeking and
obtaining endorsements from Latino politicians and celebrities, targeting
Latinos in advertising (including Spanish-language advertising) and
The four
visiting heavily Latino neighborhoods, cities and states.
newspapers collectively ran seventy-three articles on this theme (one-fifth
of the total coverage of Latinos), with their distribution across the four
varying considerably. The Los Angeles Times had about one-quarter of
their articles on the Latino electorate on this theme (thirty articles), whereas
it was less than ten percent of the coverage of The New York Times
(twenty-two articles), The Chicago Tribune (twelve articles), and The
Dallas Morning News (nine articles). These articles complement those in
the first thematic category to the extent that the newspapers saw Obama's
hard-scrabble fighting for the Latino vote as consistent with Latinos'
support for Clinton (as well as her efforts to maintain her hold on their
support).
The third most prominent theme among the articles on the Latino
electorate was the black-brown divide and how it would keep Latinos from
supporting Obama, were he to get the Democratic Party's nomination for
president. Sixty-two articles, or just over one-sixth of the total number of
articles, focused on the idea that Latino voters would not support an
African-American candidate for president - almost as large of a proportion
as the second theme. Coverage on this theme was more than one-quarter of
The Chicago Tribune's total coverage of the Latino electorate (twenty of
eighty-five articles), and it was more than one-fifth of the reporting by The
Dallas Morning News (fifteen of eighty-two articles). As a proportion of
stories, it was less prevalent in The New York Times (one-tenth or twelve
articles) and The Los Angeles Times (one-seventh or fifteen articles).
Overall, then, the black-brown divide was an enduring and central part of
the press coverage of the Latino electorate, and it likely had an effect on
how both Latino and non-Latino readers viewed the presidential election
and the larger question of relations between Latinos and African
Americans. In this way, these newspapers came to shape the conventional
wisdom that a rift between blacks and Latinos existed historically and in
the present and that it would keep Latinos from supporting Obama, were he
to win the Democratic nomination for president. When this theme is
combined with the first theme that Latinos were throwing their support
behind Clinton, together they constitute more than half the total articles on
Latino voters (210 articles). This finding provides a strong sense of the
media's power to set agendas (such as Obama's need to play catch-up with
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Latino voters) and to shape core ideas that compose the common sense of
race, like the idea that Latinos' conflict with African Americans was both
natural and inevitable.
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLACK-BROWN DIVIDE
A. Origins of the Black-Brown Divide in the 2008 Election
The so-called black-brown divide surfaced in all four newspapers in
mid-January 2008.76 It coincided with comments by Sergio Bendixen, a
Cuban American pollster hired as part of the Clinton campaign. Bendixen
was quoted in The New Yorker as saying that Latinos were not willing to
vote for Obama because he was black.
The New Yorker article was one of the first articles in the national media
to report on "the Bradley effect," which we heard so much about during the
2008 presidential election. Reporter Ryan Lizza summed up "the Bradley
effect" this way: "In both cases [Tom Bradley's run for California governor
in 1982, and Douglas Wilder's 1989 run for governor in Virginia], white
voters were more willing to tell pollsters that they supported the black
candidate than they were to actually vote for him."7 7 In an 18-paragraph
article written after the Iowa (Jan. 3) and New Hampshire (Jan. 8)
primaries and prior to the Nevada primary (Jan. 19), the Bradley effect was
discussed in one-third of the paragraphs. 78
Lizza did not mention Hispanic voters until the last three paragraphs.
When he did, he wrote:
Racial politics have been refreshingly absent from this campaign,
partly because of the lack of diversity in the first two states and partly
because Obama has never made his race central to his campaign.
76 While a full-scale analysis of the national media's embrace of the black/brown divide certainly is
beyond the scope of this article, my unsystematic review of the national press beyond these four
newspapers, magazines and television news is that these elements of the media fully adopted the
black/brown divide as conventional wisdom. MSNBC's Chris Matthews was characteristically blunt on
his show on January 19, 2008 when he prodded his candidates to be more blunt about the black/brown
divide:
Let me paint by numbers here. Hillary is white. Barack is black. That leaves brown ....
I
don't want to make it too complicated here. But if you're Hillary Clinton and you're going to
try to win this against an African-American candidate, who may well be the pioneer of this •
coming century in terms of opportunity for African Americans in American politics, you've
got to find some other field of play.
New Hampshire Primary Coveragefor Jan. 8- Hardballwith Chris Matthews, MSNBC.cOM, Jan. 9,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22574559/.
77 Ryan Lizza, Minority Reports: After New Hampshire,a hint of racialpolitics, THE NEW
YORKER, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121 fa-factlizza.
78 See id.
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That's about to change, as Nevada, with its large Hispanic population,
and South Carolina, with its large black population, prepare to vote.
Obama has an interest in downplaying race in both states. There are
lingering tensions between the Hispanic and black communities which
he doesn't want to inflame, and some residual skepticism among black
voters concerning Obama's electability among whites.... [1It was
Hillary's aides who started talking privately about racial politics.
They argued that on February 5th, when twenty-two states vote [socalled Super Tuesday, when 50 percent of Democratic delegates
would be up for grabs], Hillary's fire wall would be Hispanic voters in
the largest states, such as California and New York. 79
In the next and final paragraph of the article, Lizza introduces Bendixen,
whom we can assume is one of the Clinton aides referred to previously.
Bendixen noted how important the Hispanic vote would be to Clinton on
Super Tuesday. When the reporter asked him to describe Senator Clinton's
sources of support among Hispanics, he emphasized what Lizza called
Hispanics' "affinity for the Clinton era." "But," the reporter wrote, "he
was also frank about the fact that the Clintons, long beloved in the black
community, are now dependent on a less edifying political dynamic," and
here, in the very last sentence of the article, Lizza quoted Bendixen as
saying the following: "The Hispanic voter - and I want to say this very
carefully - has not shown a lot of willingness or affinity to support black
candidates." 80
The article does not quote Bendixen as offering any evidence to support
his claim, and Lizza doesn't provide any evidence of his own. Instead,
Bendixen's comment is supposed to stand on its own, as conventional
wisdom that does not require supporting evidence. It is the culmination of
the racial common sense the writer builds in the article. The writer sets-up
Bendixen's remark by making three points about race. First, the reporter
editorializes about the absence of overt talk about race in the campaign
("racial politics have been refreshingly absent from this campaign"). It is
telling that, for this reporter, race is "absent" in states with small numbers
of non-white voters (Iowa and New Hampshire) and "present" in states
with large numbers of such voters (South Carolina and Nevada). In fact,
race was arguably at play in "white" states like Iowa and New Hampshire,
given that white voters had views on "racial issues" (however those would
be defined) and that two non-white candidates were in the mix (Obama and
Richardson). Next, Lizza plants the seed of the black-brown divide as a
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 Id.
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problem for the Obama campaign at this point without quoting Bendixen
("there are lingering tensions between the Hispanic and black communities
which [Obama] doesn't want to inflame"). He then implicates the Clinton
campaign for playing the race card ("it was Hillary's aides who started
talking privately about racial politics"). 8 1
Bendixen's motive for making this comment is obvious. As a pollster
for the Clinton campaign, he wanted to play up the fact that Latino
animosity toward blacks might keep them from voting for Obama. Leading
the media in this way was critical given Clinton's loss to Obama in Iowa,
and it provided a way for the Clinton campaign to spin both the upcoming
Nevada primary and the Super Tuesday primaries when large numbers of
Latinos would be voting.
During the Nevada debates among the
Democrats seeking the nomination, moderator Tim Russert asked Clinton
whether she stood by Bendixen's comment, and she responded in the
affirmative, saying he was "making a historical statement" 82 Although we
do not know definitively, Clinton's response suggests that Bendixen's racebaiting strategy was not his alone, but owned by the broader leadership of
the campaign.
Bendixen certainly would not be expected to lead with evidence
supporting his claim, but we would expect a reporter to follow-up by
asking Bendixen for examples or by doing additional fact checking. But
why was the journalist so willing to uncritically accept Bendixen's claim,
what was his motive? Would it have been difficult to verify Latinos'
support of black candidates in past elections? 83 Even though Lizza invoked
Bradley's gubernatorial loss in California in 1982 in discussing "the
Bradley effect" in the article, he apparently did not think to ask where
Latinos stood in that election. In fact, seventy-five percent of Latino voters
supported Bradley in 1982.84 Lizza was writing in New York, so he might
have explored Latino voters' reactions to African-American David Dinkins,
81 See id.; see also Gregory Rodriguez, The Black-Brown Divide, TIME, Jan. 26, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1707221,00.html. Syndicated columnist Gregory Rodriguez
has a similar take on how Bendixen's comment shaped the news. Writing on January 26, 2008 in Time
magazine, he described Bendixen as starting "a firestorm of innuendo that has begun to shape how the
media are covering the race for the Democratic presidential nomination in the heavily Western states."
In the same column, he described how "some journalists literally borrowed Bendixen's analysis word
for word before going on to speculate about Barack Obama's political fortunes" in heavily-Hispanic
states. Id.
82 Gregory Rodriguez, Clinton's Latino Spin, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at A15, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/28/opinion/oe-rodriguez28 (discussing Clinton's response to
comments made by pollster Sergio Bendixen).
83 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 82 (stating that Latino's have shown an affinity to support black
candidates).
84 Id.
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elected mayor of New York City in 1989 (the same year that Wilder lost in
Virginia). Dinkins carried seventy-three percent of the Latino electorate. 85
In talking about this article in a variety of venues, audience members
who have heard me often suggest that the best explanation for why the
press did not support claims of the black-brown divide, was basic laziness;
i.e., journalists preferred an easy explanation over doing more thorough
research under a tight deadline. I am less inclined to accept this answer, at
least in part because I think well of journalists. Although I acknowledge
that they work under challenging time constraints, I do not think most
reporters are lazy. I find more persuasive the idea that the black-brown
divide simply rang true to them, as conventional wisdom that did not need
backing up with evidence. In particular, the black-brown divide would
resonate with white reporters and editors, who are the vast majority of
those working at these newspapers.
Whatever the rationale, reporters writing for The New York Times, The
Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune and The Dallas Morning News
tended to make the same call. Newspaper articles highlighting the blackbrown divide appeared as soon as the New Yorker article became available
in mid-January. On January 15, in an article datelined from Las Vegas,
The New York Times first mentioned the divide in the context of the
presidential election, saying, "Mr. Obama confronts a history of often
uneasy and competitive relations between blacks and Hispanics." 86 The
initial New York Times article, headlined "In Obama's Pursuit of Latinos,
Race Plays Role," seemed to exert a powerful influence on the other
newspapers surveyed here. 87
It is noteworthy among the articles on this theme because it was one of
the most thoroughly reported of the articles touting the divide. It carried
quotes or paraphrased comments from eight interviews about the blackbrown divide - two from person-on-the-street interviews (both Spanishsurnamed), five from politicians (national and state level, three with Latino
surnames), and one from a non-politician expert (a Stanford University
professor who is Mexican American). 88 Perhaps because it was the first
article in the mainstream press to link the black-brown divide to the
85 Id.
86 Adam Nagourney & Jennifer Seinhauer, In Obama's Pursuitof Latinos, Race Plays Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/politics/15hispanic.html?ri &page
wanted=print.
87 See id. In part, this may be due to the continuing role of The New York Times as the leading daily
newspaper in the nation and the corresponding attention it is paid by reporters and editors of other
newspapers. Id.
88 Id
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presidential election, the 1,711-word article was more careful than typical
articles (including fourteen later articles in The New York Times) to present
both sides of the issue. For example, it included quotes from New Mexico
Governor Bill Richardson and Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa to
the effect that they did not think Clinton's deep support among Hispanics
reflected their antipathy to African-American voters. 89 Alongside those
comments, the article featured Rev. Al Sharpton's comment that the blackbrown divide would be a problem for Obama. 90
In contrast to The New York Times' presentation of the black-brown
divide, The Chicago Tribune first mentioned it only as a small part of its
focus on the Nevada election, rather than in an article highlighting it.
Indeed, the comment that "there often has been political tension among
blacks and Hispanics" was almost buried in a 1,090-word article. 9 1 But in a
related article four days after The New York Times article on the blackbrown divide, The Chicago Tribune framed the Nevada caucuses as "an
initial litmus test on whether a black-Latino divide exists." 9 2 The 1,067word article positioned itself as questioning the black-brown divide (a subheading before the article's seventh paragraph read: "A 'black-brown'
divide?"), and quoted expert Roberto Suro of the University of Southern
California (and formerly of the Pew Hispanic Center) as follows: "There's
no question that there is no automatic alliance, nor is there automatic
enmity .... You can find examples of really bloody competition and really
strong cooperation" across the country. 93 Despite this promising start,
however, The Chicago Tribune was the most likely of the four newspapers
reviewed to present the black-brown divide as a central theme in its
coverage of Latino voters and the 2008 presidential election.
In 1,626 words of coverage (including side bars) on January 17, The Los
Angeles Times carried an in-depth story on how Clinton and Obama were
courting Latinos and in this context first mentioned the black-brown
divide. 94 Under a sub-headline "Testing race relations," the article spoke of
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See John McCormick & Michael Martinez, Casinos Wild Cardin Nevada Caucuses, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 15, 2008, at C14.
92 Michael Martinez & John McCormick, Latinos No Sure Bet in Nevada; Dem Rivals Fight for
Key Minority's Vote, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2008, at CI.
93 See McCormick & Martinez, supra note 92, at C14. Both Chicago Tribune articles were coreported by a reporter with a Spanish surname, Michael Martinez. Id.
94 See Mark Z. Barabak & Robin Abcarian, Campaign '08: Courting Voters, Democrats Go Deep
to Court Latino Vote, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17. 2008, at Al (discussing tensions between Latinos and
African Americans); see also Robin Abcarian, Clinton and Obama Court Gloria Molina, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17. 2008, at A I (outlining Gloria Molina's influence on Latino voters).
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"the sometimes fraught relations between Latinos and African Americans,
a tension rooted in economic competition that has been an incendiary
element of politics in cities as far-ranging as Los Angeles, Chicago, and
New York." 95 Yet the article failed to provide any evidence of that claim no experts were quoted to support it and no evidence of Latinos' electoral
support or lack of it for black candidates in those cities was provided.
Clinton pollster Sergio Bendixen may have been an unquoted source on
this claim, since he was quoted for another proposition later in the article.
The article quotes Bendixen as talking about how the candidates should try
to raise excitement among Latino voters, saying: "Voters that were born in
other [countries such as] Puerto Rico, Mexico, Central America - talk
about elections being a party, with music, concerts, emotional speeches ...
To get people out, you need to create that sort of atmosphere." 96 After this
first mention in The Los Angeles Times, there were fourteen additional
articles with the black-brown divide as a primary theme in The Los Angeles
Times, totaling one-seventh of the paper's coverage of Latinos and the
presidential election.
Although one-fifth of all The Dallas Morning News' articles on the
Latino electorate featured some analysis of the black-brown divide, that
paper presented an unusual twist on the theme. For one thing, it first
appeared in the context of staff editorials, rather than in the paper's news
The Dallas Morning News editorial board member Tod
coverage.
Robberson made the following comment on February 7: "I think racial
factors are definitely coming into play.... One thing for sure: Obama has
got to make inroads into the Hispanic community and allay whatever fears
or concerns they have about him if he wants to carry their votes in
Texas." 97 Three days later in the newspaper's editorial column, Robberson

and the rest of the board expanded under the headline "Unity Despite
Differences: Dems' Race Highlights Urgency for Racial Accord":
"Unfortunately, the supposed 'brown-black' divide is surfacing as an issue
in

Texas ... we

shouldn't

ignore

that

real

animosities

and

misunderstandings obstruct Hispanic and black unity." 98 These editorials
seemed to coincide with the newspaper's coverage of Super Tuesday
(Feb. 5), as well as Texas' primary on March 4th. Despite the fact that the
95 Barabak & Abcarian, supra note 94.
96 Id.

97 Tod Robberson, Race and the Election, Editorial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 2008, at
15A.
98 Unity Despite Differences: Dems' Race Highlights Urgency for Racial Accord, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 2008, at 2P.
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newspaper is based in a city were an African American was elected with
substantial Latino support - Ron Kirk, who went on to capture the lion's
share of the Latino electorate when he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S.
Senate - The Dallas Morning News never explored how these electoral
experiences might have challenged the conventional wisdom of the blackbrown divide.
While there are interesting variations in how they did so, these four
newspapers ultimately reported on the black-brown divide as if it was racial
common sense - something known by everyone, a basic foundational fact
we could all take for granted. Even when the black-brown divide was not
taken for granted in the initial reporting of it (as with the coverage of The
Chicago Tribune), it was repeated over and over again in all four papers,
and in this way became enshrined as conventional wisdom that did not
require evidence in the form of expert quotes, public opinion surveys,
historical examples or man/woman-on-the-street interviews - the typical
fodder for journalistic evidence. Contrast this with the energy the media
spent investigating whether (and how many) whites would refuse to vote
for Obama because he was black. While the fact that some whites were
racists was presumed, it was never assumed (by the majority-white media)
that all whites were racists or that the majority of whites were. Instead, the
media spent countless dollars investigating how many whites were racist
and what kinds of ideas might really constitute anti-black racism that might
influence voting pattems. 99
B. Debunking the Black-brown Divide
Interestingly, as The Chicago Tribune and The Los Angeles Times were
reporting for the first time on the black-brown divide's potential impact on
the presidential election, nationally syndicated editorial columnists based at
these two papers were among the few voices in the press to challenge

99 See Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Elections '08 President: Blacks Worry Obama Lead Too Good to be
True: Some Wonder About 'BradleyEffect, ' in Which Polls Don't Reflect Accurately How Whites Will
Vote, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 26, 2008, at IA (describing the uncertainty of polls because white
voters may lie to questioners so as not to seem racist); see also Dave Michaels, Swing State:
Pennsylvania: Race is Still in Play in West Partof State, Some Just Won't Vote for a Black Candidate,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4, 2008, at IOA (featuring quotes from an admitted racist who would
not vote for Barack Obama, and a man who said he would, lending some credence to the region's
reputation as racist); Clarence Page, Obama Hurdle Called 'Bubba', CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2008, at 27
(noting that a prominent Republican had recently called white, working-class voters the 'Bubba' vote,
but that it is difficult to determine if people vote the way they do because of race); Kate Zemike, Do
Polls Lie About Race?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, Week in Review, at I (admitting that it is unclear
how much racism affects polls or voting, one reason being that there are so many variables to take into
account).
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Bendixen. 100 Gregory Rodriguez, a Mexican American columnist for The
Los Angeles Times, called Bendixen's bluff in a January 28 editorial,
providing numerous examples of Latino voters' support for black
candidates in congressional and mayoral elections.101 The Tribune's
Clarence Page, who is African American, wrote January 30 that Bendixen's
remarks were calculated to be a "wedge that might be driven between
Obama and Hispanic voters." 102 Page foreshadowed the traction the blackbrown divide would have in the media when he warned, "Obama faces an
uphill fight as his campaign tries to prevent the talk of a black-Hispanic
03
divide from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy."'
In this section, I assess whether the evidence supports a black-brown
divide as an important factor in the 2008 presidential election. I look at
three types of evidence: polling data after Obama won the Democratic
nomination; data from Election Day; and data on Latino voting behavior in
past elections involving African American candidates. While primary
results in many states revealed Latinos' strong support for Clinton, the
polling done after the primaries showed most of her supporters rapidly
shifting their allegiance to Obama.104 These poll results, available in July,
100 In fact, we can reasonably ask why, after their own columnists challenged and refuted
Bendixen's assertion of the black-brown divide, neither The Los Angeles Times nor The Chicago
Tribune ran an item correcting its embrace of the myth. Nor did either newspaper stop routinely
referring to the black-brown divide in their coverage of Latinos and the presidential election. See Maria
L. La Ganga, Campaign '08: Talking to Voters; Bridge Racial Gap Says Obama; At a town hall event
in L.A., he talks about the 'black-brown divide.' He and Clinton are seeking Latino voters, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, at A12. See also Michael Martinez, Beyond red, blue states, it's black vs. brown votes,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2008, at 12. One possible dynamic may have been that Rodriguez and Page were
seen as "biased" because they were men of color, and therefore not seen as reliable sources whose
claims warranted a correction by the papers.
101 See Rodriguez, supra note 83, at A15 (pointing to black politicians, such as former mayor of
New York, David Dinkins, and Charles Rangel, U.S. Representative from Harlem, New York, who
have received broad Latino support in winning elections).
102 Clarence Page, Clinton's Hispanic edge over Obama; Any lead has more to do with coattails
than race, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2008, at 21.
103 Id.
104 For example, a national poll in July by the Pew Hispanic Center showed Latinos supporting
Obama three to one over McCain. See MARK HUGO LOPEZ & SUSAN MINUSHKIN, 2008 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANIC VOTER ATTITUDES 2, Pew Hispanic Center, (2008), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/90.pdf. A July field poll of California voters showed white
support for Obama at forty-seven percent (thirty-seven percent for McCain) and Latino support for
Obama at sixty-four percent (twenty-one percent for McCain); see also MARK DICAMILLO AND
MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION, OBAMA LEADING MCCAIN BY 24 POINTS IN
CALIFORNIA. HIS BACKERS ARE MUCH MORE ENTHUSIASTIC THAN MCCAIN'S. CLINTON'S PRESENCE

OR ABSENCE FROM DEMOCRATIC TICKET NOT A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE 4 (July 16, 2008), available at
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2276.pdf. One factor may have been the change in
Latinos' support for the war between 2004, when forty percent of Latinos voted to re-elect Bush, see
Julia Preston, Poll Finds HispanicsReturning to EarlierPreferencefor Democrats,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2007, at 28. In 2008, one poll showed that nearly seventy percent of Latinos were against the war in
Iraq, with almost fifty percent favoring an immediate withdrawal from Iraq, see LatinInsights poll, July
2008 (On File with Author). In late 2006, when one poll showed that sixty-six percent of Latinos
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never prompted The New York Times or the other three newspapers to run
corrections about their earlier black-brown divide claims, but they probably
led (consciously or not) to the decreasing prominence of the black-brown
divide as a theme in the papers' coverage of the Latino electorate.
Data on how Latinos voted on Election Day (and in early voting) directly
refutes the claim that anti-black racism would keep Latinos from
supporting an African-American candidate for president (or that it was such
racism which led them to support Hillary Clinton during the primaries).
According to New York Times exit polling data, there were striking
differences among racial groups in their support of Obama - but not in
ways that vindicated the black-brown divide: forty-three percent of whites
voted for Obama, sixty-seven percent of Latinos did, along with sixty-two
percent of Asian Americans, and ninety-five percent of African
Americans. 105 If anything, these numbers suggest a black-white divide.
Latinos' voting behavior finally led to some recognition in the press that
it was time to put the black-brown divide to rest. On November 10, an
Associated Press article written by a Spanish-surnamed reporter concluded
that the election results "shattered the myth of a black-Latino divide."1 06
New York Times columnist Frank Rich, who is white, had this to say about
Bendixen five days after Obama was elected president:
In one of the more notorious observations of the campaign year, a
Clinton pollster, Sergio Bendixen, told The New Yorker in January
that 'the Hispanic voter - and I want to say this very carefully - has
not shown a lot of willingness or affinity to support black
candidates.' Let us say very carefully that a black presidential
candidate won Latinos - the fastest-growing demographic in the
electorate - 67 percent to 31 (up from Kerry's 53-to-44 edge and
Gore's 62-to-35).107
Likewise, Ruben Navarrette, a syndicated columnist based at The San
Diego Union-Tribune, chided pundits for having "insisted that this brownblack feud would undoubtedly carry into the voting booth."108 On Election
wanted to bring troops home as soon as possible, while nineteen percent of Latinos preferred to keep
troops in Iraq until the situation stabilized, see Pew Hispanic Center, Latinos and the War in Iraq 2
(2007), availableat http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/27.pdf.
105 See Marjorie Connelly, Dissecting the ChangingElectorate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, Week
in Review, at 5 (analyzing numbers based on exit polling of 17,836 voters at 300 polling places and
phone interviews with 2,378 voters who voted early or absentee).
106 Moreno, supra note 9 (noting the influence that Latino voters command when they unite for an
election).
107 Frank Rich, It Still Felt Good the Morning After, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at 9; see
Rodriguez, supra note 82 (highlighting the impact of Sergio Bendixen's remarks in The New Yorker).
108 Ruben Navarrette Jr., Latinos Prove Pundits Wrong on Obama, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 9,
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Day, Navarrette proclaimed, Latinos "drove a stake through the heart of
conventional wisdom" that they wouldn't vote for an African American for
president. 109
If reporters had bothered to check the facts (and if editors had insisted
they do so), they would have known that, despite many reasons Latinos and
African Americans might have for distrusting each other, Latinos had
shown substantial support for black candidates in past elections. Consider
that, according to editorial writer Gregory Rodriguez, at least eight current
black members of Congress represent heavily Latino districts (mostly from
California and New York).1l0 Political scientist Matt A. Barreto has
compiled data on several mayoral elections in which African Americans
were elected with more than seventy percent of the Latino vote: Harold
Washington carried eighty percent of Latinos in Chicago in 1983; David
Dinkins carried seventy-three percent of Latinos in New York City in 1989;
Ron Kirk carried seventy-five percent of Latinos in Dallas in 2002 (and
carried eighty percent of Latinos state-wide when he unsuccessfully ran for
the U.S. Senate in 2006); Wellington Webb carried seventy percent of
Latinos in Denver in 1991.111 As noted previously, Tom Bradley had the
votes of seventy-five percent of Latinos when he lost the California
gubernatorial race in 1982.112 It is all the more surprising that reporters for
the four newspapers studied here did not explore Latinos' actual support for
black mayoral candidates in the past, given that each of the four cities has
both a significant Latino population and has elected a black mayor in the
past forty years.
The electoral numbers, in 2008 and in past elections, do not definitively
prove there is not a black-brown divide; they only prove that, if there is
one, it did not bleed into the voting booth. Some would diminish Latinos'
support for black candidates by attributing it to party loyalty. Depending
on the level of the election and the Latino sub-group, Latinos are
Democrats at rates ranging from sixty to eighty percent, compared to
African Americans at eighty-five to ninety percent.11 3 Still, if we are
2008, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/op-ed/navarrette/20081109-9999-1z I e9navarre.html.
109 Id.
110 See Rodriguez, supra note 82.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Luis R. Fraga & David Leal, Race, Ethnicity, and National Party Politics, in BLACK AND
LATINO/A POLITICS: ISSUES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 222 (William E.

Nelson, Jr. & Jessica Lavariega Monforti. eds., 2005) (citing data from various elections in 2000 and
2002); see Helena Alves Rodrigues & Gary M. Segura, A Placeat the Lunch Counter: Latinos, African
Americans, and the Dynamics of American Race Politics, in LATINO POLITICS: IDENTITY,
MOBILIZATION, AND REPRESENTATION 143 (Rodolfo Espino, David L. Leal & Kenneth J. Meier eds.,
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looking at the prospects for inter-racial coalition, whether behind particular
candidates or entire parties, it is hard not to see the outlines of a blackbrown coalition in Obama's election (given the gap between Latino [sixtyseven percent] and white [forty-two percent] support for Obama and the
Democrats). Both the Democrats and the Republicans must be thinking
about these facts as they look ahead to 2050, when Latinos will be thirty
percent of the U.S. population and African Americans will be fifteen
percent, and when the nation will be majority-minority.
The fact is that we scholars know far less than we should about whether,
in the larger context beyond electoral behavior, there is a meaningful divide
between Latinos and African Americans. The literature on the topic is
surprisingly sparse,' 14 especially given the fact that Latinos and African
Americans have lived in close proximity in many cities for generations
(Los Angeles and Cook counties among them). At least in part, I think this
stems from reluctance on the part of generally liberal researchers to ask
questions about race that they might not want to hear the answers to. For
some in the liberal academy, we would rather assume a different kind of
conventional wisdom that emphasizes a black-brown coalition.
Yet those of us who would hope for a flourishing black-brown coalition
do ourselves no favor by avoiding the subject. We need to begin asking the
questions, and we need to do so with specificity, taking into account the
many important differences among Latinos and African Americans (who
themselves have substantial divisions according to nativity and ethnicity

2007) ("Latinos and African Americans are more Democratic in partisanship than nonminority
Americans.").
114 See Sharon D. Wright Austin and Richard T. Middleton, IV, The 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral
Election: Implications for Deracializationand Biracial Coalition Theories, in BLACK & LATINO/A
POLITICS: ISSUES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT INTHE UNITED STATES 169, 169 (William E. Nelson, Jr.
& Jessica Lavariega Monforti eds., 2005) (stating large numbers of black voters favored the white
mayoral candidate over the Latino candidate); Karen M. Kaufmann, Divided We Stand: Mass Attitudes
and the Prospectsfor Black-Latino Urban Political Coalitions,in BLACK & LATINO/A POLITICS: ISSUES
IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 158, 158 (William E. Nelson, Jr. & Jessica
Lavariega Monforti eds., 2005) (noting that differences between blacks and Latinos prevent sustained
electoral alliances); Byron D'Andra Orey and Jessica Lavariega Monforti, Black and Brown Conflict?
InterminorityGroup Attitudes and their Impact on Policy Preferences, in BLACK & LATINO/A POLITICS:
ISSUES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT INTHE UNITED STATES 188, 188 (William E. Nelson, Jr. & Jessica
Lavariega Monforti eds., 2005) (discussing lack of research on racial attitudes between minority
groups); Adrian D. Pantoja, Friends or Foes?: African American Attitudes Toward the Politicaland
Economic Consequences of Immigration, in BLACK & LATINO/A POLITICS: ISSUES IN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 177, 177 (William E. Nelson, Jr. & Jessica Lavariega Monforti
eds., 2005) (commenting that few studies exist showing attitudes of African Americans toward
immigrants and immigration policies); Rodrigues & Segura, supra note 113, at 142 (arguing growth of
Latinos has changed the construction of race dynamic). See generally NICOLAS C. VACA, THE
PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT BETWEEN LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT

MEANS FOR AMERICA (2004) (suggesting the presumed political alliance between blacks and Latinos
does not truly exist in modem America).
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that are too often ignored by the media). We also need to provide an
historical context for the inquiry about black-brown relations, which I have
done elsewhere in writing about the necessity of understanding the
connections between the U.S.-Mexico war and the colonization of
Mexicans in the Southwest in the 1840s and 1850s and the Civil War and
Reconstruction in the 1860s and 1870s. 115
CONCLUSION

In this section I conclude by returning to the question of how racial
common sense is reproduced via the media, asking what work the myth of
the black-brown divide did to support the reigning ideology of color-blind
racism. The media's narrative about the black-brown divide in the 2008
presidential primary played three important roles: (i) it displaced white
racism by focusing on the racism of non-black people of color; (ii) it
divided non-white minorities by facilitating race-baiting tactics; (iii) it
buttressed the notion that race in the U.S. remains fundamentally a matter
of whites versus blacks, rather than a multi-racial dynamic.
One reason the black-brown divide was embraced by the predominantly
white national media was that it functions to displace white racism. 116
Writing five days after the election, San Diego-based columnist Ruben
Navarrette said, "[o]f course, the slander about not supporting an AfricanAmerican was never really about Latinos. The experts were simply
projecting onto this ethnic group the anxieties, fears and prejudices being
expressed by white voters .... Now that America's largest minority has
proved the experts wrong, where does it go to get its reputation back?"117
Asian Americans, sixty-two percent of whom voted for Obama, might
ask the same question.1 8 Although it was not as prominently featured as
the black-brown divide, the national media also put forward a black-Asian
divide. In February 2008, Time carried an article headlined, "Does Obama
Have an Asian Problem?" which asked whether Asian Americans' robust
support for Clinton (she garnered seventy-five percent of the Asian vote in
115 GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 131-47 (exploring the links between the war with Mexico and the
Civil War, and the subsequent development of different racial ideas about Mexican Americans and
African Americans).
116 See generally Nancy Wang Yuen, The Asian American Vote: Media Representations of Race
Relations in the 2008 Democratic Primaries, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 421 (2009).
Sociologist Nancy Wang Yuen reaches similar conclusions about the black-Asian divide in the
electorate. Id.
117 Navarrette, Jr., supra note 108.
118 Connelly, supra note 105, at 5 (explaining results are based on exit polling of 17,836 voters at
300 polling places and phone interviews with 2,378 voters who voted early or absentee).
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the California primary) was due to racism: "[C]ould some AsianAmericans not be voting for Obama simply because he's black?"1 9 When
they hear about a black-brown divide and a black-Asian divide, whites can
feel less guilty about their own collective racism. 120 In a sense, they can
say, "well, those other minorities are anti-black too, so we are not so bad."
The displacement of white racism also serves to distract all of us from
thinking about white privilege and institutional racism, which are not
measurable via public opinion polls or individual-level survey data.
A second function of the black-brown divide is to split people of color
via race-baiting. If the first function targeted a white audience, this second
function targets Latinos and African Americans. In essence, the blackbrown divide says to Latinos, "come on, you know you don't like blacks,
and they don't like you." It says to African Americans, "Latinos don't like
you (and your candidate), so you shouldn't like them." Legal scholar
Richard Ford, the author of The Race Card.- How Bluffing About Bias
Makes Race Relations Worse, reacted to Bendixen's comments in The New
Yorker. 121 "These kinds of statements generate interracial tension... [they]
could make black voters more hostile to Latinos. And Latinos who hear it
might think that they somehow ought to be at odds with blacks."' 22
Just as we should not simplistically lump all Latinos together in a
monolith, we must recognize that race-baiting tactics do not come in "one
size fits all" (which was part of the problem with Bendixen's comment - if
he had been historically and regionally specific, he may have been better
able to make his case). A vivid example of targeted black-brown racebaiting occurred in Albuquerque, New Mexico in September 2008.
Fernando de Baca, the head of the Republican Party in New Mexico's most
populous county, was quoted by the BBC as saying, "[t]he truth is that
Hispanics came here as conquerors. African-Americans came here as
slaves... Hispanics won't vote for a black president."1 23 This comment
attempted to use notions of heritage fairly specific to Mexican Americans
in New Mexico, which I describe elsewhere as being the site of double-

119 Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, Does Obama Have an Asian Problem?, TIME, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://www. time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1714292,00.html.
120 See Yuen, supra note 116, at 423-24.
121

See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE

RELATIONS WORSE 31-36 (2008) (arguing race relations are undermined by playing up racial
stereotypes and tensions).
122 Rodriguez, supra note 82, at A15.
123 Republican Quits in Hispanic Row, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/763911 L.stm.
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colonization, the first by Spain and the second by the U.S.124 It also
attempts to summon a kind of racial pride that would displace both blacks
(explicitly) and Native Americans (implicitly, by invoking the Spanish
25
conquest of the regions indigenous people). 1
As with the general black-brown divide, the notion of a black-Hispanic
conflict - rooted in a centuries-old rivalry in New Mexico - was not borne
out on Election Day. Despite Clinton's narrow victory in New Mexico's
February 5 primary (although she won Latinos by a larger margin), New
Mexico was securely in Obama's column in November with its thirty-seven
percent Latino electorate (more than any other state). In nine of thirty-three
New Mexico counties where Hispanics are a majority of the population,
Obama beat McCain in percentages ranging from fifty-one to eighty
percent.1 26 In all nine of these majority-Hispanic New Mexico counties,
Obama outperformed 2004 Democratic nominee John Kerry by seven to
twelve percentage points.127 Obama did especially well in two heavilyHispanic, rural counties where either he or Michelle Obama visited in the
weeks before Nov. 4 - in San Miguel (eighty percent) and Rio Arriba
(seventy-five percent) counties. 128
Despite seeming to envision a multi-racial tapestry, the black-brown
divide reinforced the notion that race remains fundamentally a matter of the
black-white dichotomy. Positioning Latinos (and Asian Americans) as
anti-black has the effect of moving them closer to the white side of the
white-black divide (or non-black-black divide). In fact, this positioning of
non-black, non-white groups may further entrench the white-black divide,
even as it seems to take account of groups like Latinos. After all, if Latinos
are more like whites in their antipathy to blacks, then the white-black
124 See generally GOMEZ, supra note 21, at 1-2 (discussing the double colonization of New
Mexico).
125 Laura E. G6mez, It's Time to Dispel Conquistador Myth, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 28, 2008,
available
at
http://www.abqjournal.con/opinion/guest columns/2810253opinion09-28-08.htm
(describing the mythology surrounding the influence of Spanish colonization in the Americas).
126 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW MEXICO BY COUNTY, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
GCTTable?_bm=n&_lang--en&mtname=DEC_2000_PLU_GCTPL_ST2&format-ST-2&box head
nbr=GCT-PL&ds name=DEC_2000_PLU&geo_id=04000US35 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) (showing
that the nine majority-Hispanic counties in New Mexico, according to 2004 data from the U.S. Census,
are as follows: Bemalillo, Dofia Ana, Guadalupe, Hidalgo, Luna, Mora, Rio Arriba, San Miguel and
Taos); see State of Change, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 23, 2008, at B7 (Journal staff report) (containing
data on the electorate's support for Obama)
127 State of Change,supra note 126, at B7.
128 Persistentpoverty and the 2008 rural vote (Part 11): The Hispanic vote, Nov. 22, 2008,
http://legalruralism.blogspot.com/2008/l 1/persistent-poverty-and-2008-rural-vote22.html;
Michelle Obama to Hold Rally in NM on Tuesday, http://haussamen.blogspot.com/2008/10/michelleobama-to-hold-rally-in-nm-on.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (mentioning Michelle Obama visited
Las Vegas, New Mexico, county seat of San Miguel, on October 28, 2008).
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binary could persist, with simply some adjustment to encompass a larger,
more diverse "white" category. In this narrative, blacks are the "real"
minorities, and Latinos are merely posers. Latinos are positioned as a
wedge group, dividing whites and blacks. It is not unusual for Mexican
Americans to be positioned as a wedge group in American society. In their
more than 150-year history in this country, Mexican Americans frequently
were positioned in the national racial order as a wedge group below whites
and above African Americans. 129
As Los Angeles Times columnist Gregory Rodriguez has noted, the
media's trumpeting of a black-brown divide played into the Clinton
campaign's efforts to undermine Obama's central claim that he was a
30
candidate who could unite Americans of all racial backgrounds.1
Consider the press reaction to Obama's race speech in Philadelphia, which
13 1
was an attempt to address the crisis over Rev. Wright's comments.
Obama worked hard in certain parts of the speech to present the U.S. as a
multi-racial society - to explicitly breakdown the idea that race in this
nation involves only whites and blacks. "At this moment, in this election,
we can come together and say, 'Not this time.' This time, we want to talk
about the crumbling schools that are stealing the future of black children
and white children and Asian children and Hispanic children and NativeAmerican children." 132
Yet Obama himself illustrated the pull of the white-black notion of race,
going back and forth in presenting race as black and white vs. as multiracial.133 In part, Obama's dilemma was how to respond to the Wright
scandal, and the fact that Wright's comments themselves were framed in
black and white terms. At other points in the speech, Obama invoked the
historical context of slavery, the Civil War and Reconstruction, and he
129 See generally G6MEZ, supra note 21. In the context of New Mexico specifically, Mexican
Americans were positioned as a wedge group with whites above them and Pueblo Indians below them.
Id. In the New Mexico context, it was to whites' advantage to separate these two large groups which
both were present as "native" groups when the Americans invaded Mexico in 1846; Mexican
Americans were allowed many rights and privileges associated with white status, while Pueblo Indians
were excluded from them. Id.
130 See Rodriguez, supra note 82, at A15 (claiming that Clinton's efforts may ultimately be selffulfilling prophecies that generate more interracial tension).
131 See Senator Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union in Philadelphia, PA (Mar. 18, 2008),
available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/contentihisownwords/. Barack Obama gives a response
to the controversial and divisive comments made by Reverend Wright five days earlier. Id. See also
Brian Ross & Rehab El-Buni, Obama's Pastor: God Damn America, U.S. to Blame for 9/11, ABC
NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/blotter/Story?id=4443788&page=l. The Wright scandal
was first reported on March 13, 2008. Id.
132 Id.
133 See id.(revealing that Obama used the word "black" and "white" repeatedly throughout his
speech, but at no point used the word "multi-racial").
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would be hard-pressed to do so without speaking in white-black terms.
Overall, Obama's Philadelphia speech alternated between invoking
American history in black-white terms, and an American present in multiracial terms.
But press coverage of the speech overwhelmingly cast race as white
versus black, ignoring Obama's nods to a multi-racial view of race. For
example, in a March 20 article on reactions to the speech, The New York
Times spoke of "both races," an audience for the speech "of black and
1 34
white supporters," and ongoing "divisions between blacks and whites."
A March 23 article in The Los Angeles Times told of "a black America and
a white America" and purported to represent opposing, black and white
views on Obama's speech.13 5 In the 1,800-word article, the reporter
intentionally interviewed only self-identified whites and blacks from two
small towns (blacks in Lithonia, Georgia and whites in Franktown,
Colorado), never explaining why these locales where chosen. She quoted
ten non-experts about their attitudes toward the speech. 136 In terms of the
coverage of the Philadelphia speech by the mainstream press, Obama's
calls for a multi-racial understanding of the nation were pretty much
ignored.
Contemporary racial dynamics are as fraught with complexity and
competing interpretations as race was historically in the U.S. The
significance of this article on press coverage of the Latino electorate may
be that it provides a wake-up call. It is time the media acknowledged the
nation's truly multi-racial character and began reporting in a more complex
way on a more complex nation, Latinos, in their myriad diversity, included.

134 Jeff Zeleny, Obama Works to Shift Campaign Back to Domestic Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2008, at A21.
135 Stephanie Simon & Richard Fausset, Talking About Race: Urn, You First; Obama's Speech
Calledfor a Conversation That Not Everyone Wants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at Al (interviewing
black and white citizens ranging from the ages of 36-65 years old).
136 Id.

